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THE LONG TRANSFORMATION FOR A
DEMOCRATIC WORLD ORDER
Yoshikazu Sakamoto
I. Introduction: Contemporary Historic Developments
The post–Cold War world has witnessed the following four fun-
damental developments, all of which are unprecedented in his-
tory.
A. Unipolar World Military Order
The emergence of unipolar world military order centers on the
United States as the hegemonic global military power. It is true
that the Roman Empire, for instance, built a unipolar military
order; but it was, in fact, a regional unipolarity in a world con-
sisting of other regional empires in China, India, and so forth,
which were mutually isolated with a low degree of interaction.
This is the first time global military unipolarity has come into
existence.
It must at the same time be noted that the military superiority
(or even supremacy) of the United States, unchallenged by any
comparable contender, by no means implies that the United
States is militarily omnipotent. The United States is incapable of
putting Bosnia, Serbia, Liberia, Somalia, or Rwanda under its
military control, let alone Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and so forth.
No doubt the United States is at the top of the world military
pyramid, but it is incapable of keeping all stones beneath in
order. This is probably a consequence not so much of the limits
of U.S. military power as of the limits to military power as such,
particularly in the contemporary world characterized by the
three following developments.
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B. Single Capitalist Global Market
It is true that, since the sixteenth century, the various regions of
the world have been incorporated by European powers into the
capitalist world. Yet, even in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, many “underdeveloped” societies still constituted a “dual
society,” comprising both modernized sectors and a sizable tra-
ditional rural sector that had been only remotely affected by
modern capitalist penetration. During the “development
decades” which began in the early 1960s, the capitalist world
economy rapidly engulfed the “traditional sectors,” intensifying
what the dependence school conceptualized as the “develop-
ment of underdevelopment.” Dual society began to be inte-
grated into a capitalist world economy.
It was, however, in the 1960s that the Soviet Union, where the
postwar reconstruction was well under way, proclaimed an
alternative economic order—the socialist COMECON. This was
different from the pre – World War II period, when the lone
USSR was secluded from the world economy dominated by the
capitalist blocs, including the fascist camps. Now, with the col-
lapse of the socialist system, the world as a whole has begun to
constitute a single capitalist market economy for the first time in
modern history.
C. The Universalization of Nationalism
It goes without saying that nationalism, which originated in the
West of modern times, spread to non-Western societies, taking
the form of anti-Western nationalism, which culminated in the
massive tricontinental decolonization and national liberation
movements in the post–World War II period. Paradoxically, the
Soviet Union, which originally served as a source of ideological
inspiration for the colonial peoples engaged in the struggle
against Western imperialism, turned out — after a short period
of Lenin’s defense of “national self-determination” aimed at dis-
integrating the tsarist empire — to be a reconsolidated Russian
empire. In the aftermath of World War II, the empire extended
to Eastern Europe.
In the course of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, nationalism
— which had historically prevailed in the West and then the
Macalester International Vol. 1
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“Third World” — spread to the “last empire,” giving rise to the
eruption of ethno-nationalist demands of captive nationalities of
the former USSR. For the first time in history, nationalism has
been universally put into effect.
D. The Globalization of Democracy
Policies and movements for democratization were persistently
obstructed by antidemocratic forces even in the “advanced”
countries such as nineteenth-century Britain and France. When
the three democratic powers — Britain, France, and the United
States — laid the groundwork for the Versailles settlement, the
system was to be challenged by two counterforces.
Fascism in Germany, Japan, and Italy staged a frontal attack
on democracy, rejecting it as illegitimate, unworkable, and/or
corrupt. State socialism of the Soviet Union opposed Western
democracy by proclaiming that proletarian democracy was gen-
uinely democratic while bourgeois democracy was a fake. While
fascism was openly antidemocratic, state socialism was ostensi-
bly “prodemocratic,” though both were against liberal democ-
racy.
As a result of the demise of the fascist Axis in 1945, the world
was divided into two camps, which the West defined in terms of
“democracy versus authoritarianism” but which the East char-
acterized as the conflict between “two democracies,” with the
East standing for “democratic centrism,” “people’s democracy,”
and so forth. The adoption of democratic rhetoric by the East
was the incipient universalization of democracy as the ideologi-
cal source of political legitimation. This gave rise to an interest-
ing situation in which it became increasingly difficult and risky
even for an authoritarian regime to openly defy democracy as
the ultimate goal of polity, if not its present reality.
Thus, after the demise of state socialism, the authoritarian
regimes of developing countries must—at least rhetorically, and
at times apologetically — acknowledge through the promise of
election and the transfer of power to civilian government, etc.
that the authoritarian system is a transitional device necessitated
by the development requirements of a less developed country
that will ultimately turn into a democracy. Or, they may
acknowledge that, although the Western model of democracy
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does not fit the sociocultural conditions of the country, they will
develop their own model of democracy. This is in sharp contrast
to the Nazis or Japanese militarists, who held the view that nei-
ther were their democracies of their own model nor were 
their regimes a transitional step toward ultimate democratiza-
tion. Today, antidemocracy cannot claim legitimacy in its own
right. In short, in the post – Cold War world, democracy has
gained universality for the first time in history.
I have identified four global trends: (1) unipolarization of
world military order, (2) globalization of the capitalist market
economy, (3) universalization of nationalism, and (4) globaliza-
tion of democracy. These four trends can be considered to be the
manifestations of two deeper processes of global change. The
first two trends are reflections of the trend toward international-
ization, i.e., they refer to the process that cuts across the national
boundaries, transcending and eroding the nation-state system.
The latter two reflect the deeper process of democratization, i.e.,
that the universalization of nationalism refers to the trend
toward international equality or equality of nations, and that the
globalization of democracy is the manifestation of the struggle
for and the establishment of the equality of universal human
rights. The first process refers to horizontal widening and the lat-
ter to vertical deepening.
II. Dialectics of Modern History
Although these four dynamics (or the two underlying deeper
trends) are the salient features of the post–Cold War world, they
are not the consequences of the end of the Cold War. They are
manifestations of the longer-term, more fundamental dynamics
of change that have characterized modern history. In fact, the
end of the Cold War (and the beginning of the Cold War, for
that matter) were the consequences of this more fundamental
historical dynamic of change that took these particular forms at
particular moments in history. What, then, is the deeper histori-
cal dynamic, and what are the engines of modern historical
change?
Reflecting the sense of history related to the present global
transformation, one can define the contemporary phase of his-
torical development in various terms such as “post-West-
Macalester International Vol. 1
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phalian,” “postindustrial,” or “postmodern.” It is not certain
whether we are truly in a “post-‘’ phase, nor is it clear what a
“post-‘’ phase really means beyond the negative implication that
things are no longer as they were. Paradoxical as it may sound,
it is through the identification of the deeper continuing dynamic
that underlies the change into the “post-‘’ phase that the disconti-
nuity between the past and the “post-” can be appreciated.
Along these lines, we argue that underlying the historical
change in the modern times are the fundamental contradictions
on the following three dimensions, in terms of which major con-
flicts and changes in modern history can be accounted for: (1)
capitalism (C) vs. socialism (S); (2) state nationalism (N) vs.
internationalism (I); and (3) democracy (D) vs. authoritarianism
(A).
By modern history, we refer to the period since the latter half
of the eighteenth century, when these contradictions became
increasingly prominent as the result of the interrelated emer-
gence of industrial capitalism, political nationalism, and liberal
democracy in major Western “advanced” countries.1
Further, it is not only the contradictions of these three dimen-
sions but also the uneven development of the contradictions and
their components that generated complex dialectics of modern
history. Nationalism and democracy as well as capitalism (and
their respective antitheses) developed unevenly. Early-starter
capitalism gave rise to the metropole’s domination against the
periphery’s dependence; early-starter state nationalism led to
imperialism vis-à-vis colonized peoples; and early-starter
democracy generated international ideological conflict in terms
of human rights. These complex contradictions brought about
“world conflict” and consequent changes in the sense that no
society or state could be immune from the structural constraints
of these contradictions.
Focusing on the dynamics of change in modern history, we
can develop a perspective on world politics that is quite differ-
ent from the state-centric “realist” paradigm. The latter is predi-
cated on the idea that the sovereign state is the basic unit that
constitutes international relations. Just as society and the state
were conceptualized in terms of the collectivity of individuals,
international relations were also seen from an atomistic perspec-
tive, treating the sovereign state as the indivisible basic unit.
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International relations are defined essentially as anarchy. This
realist view is fundamentally static and unidimensional in the
sense that it presupposes the persistence of the state system
itself and deals merely with the mechanistic vicissitude of inter-
state geopolitical balance of power. Thus, it is incapable of
accounting for global structural changes in history as we wit-
ness it today.
In other words, the question we address today concerns not
only the interpretation of the global change under way but also
the change in the conceptualization of historical change.
III. Uneven International Structural Change
Because the modern international system originated in Europe,
we must examine the conceptualization of historical change
with reference to European history. This is not, of course, the
same as holding a Eurocentric view of world history.
Europe in the Middle Ages was ruled by the feudal elite, both
secular and ecclesiastic. There was a high degree of homogene-
ity among the ruling elite. This homogeneity was challenged at
the time of the Reformation and the Religious War. As the reli-
gious cleavage of the ruling elite was politically accommodated
through the Westphalian settlement, the European elite class
restored an increasing degree of political homogeneity as the
secular ruling elite. It is true that the dynastic states of absolute
monarchy engaged in constant warfare. Although absolutist
states created a state of international anarchy in terms of power
politics, it is no longer a state of anarchy in terms of values.
Statecraft and diplomacy were no longer dictated by the will of
God(s) but by raison d’état. The secular rules of the game were
premised on a set of values shared by the elite. Wars, though
numerous, were all limited wars. They were fought by rather
expensive mercenaries to avoid mutual annihilation of the elite.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a number of peace
proposals in favor of establishing an international organization
were presented by publicists (Éméric Crucé, Duc de Sully, Abbé
de Saint-Pierre, and others).2 In the eighteenth century, reference
was often made to “the Republic of Europe,” and “the Family of
Nations.” All these suggest that there was a European commu-
nity of aristocratic elite who shared a set of common values. It is
Macalester International Vol. 1
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not too much to say that, in effect, Europe was under the condo-
minium of warring nobilities.
This European community of homogeneous elite was first
challenged by Great Britain, which departed from it at the time
of the Glorious Revolution when the gradual merger of feudal
nobilities and the bourgeoisie began to take shape. This process
was further promoted by the independence of the United States
through the American Revolution, which, as emphasized by
Edmund Burke in the British Parliament, was essentially the
extension of the ideology of the Glorious Revolution. The third
to secede from the European aristocratic community was France
in the days of the French Revolution.
Two points must be noted in connection to this. First, the dis-
sociation of these three countries from the European aristocratic
elite community was not a mere realignment in the context of
the power game of homogeneous elite; it was de-alignment
stemming from the structural transformation of the political
regime under the control of the new elite who were heteroge-
neous to the European elite of ancien régime.
Second, it was these three countries (Britain, France, and the
United States) that, despite significant variations, consisted of
the essentially common structural complex of “capitalism (C) –
nationalism (N) – democracy (D)” and acted as the early-starter
developed countries in the world of the last two centuries. It is
this C-N-D model that played the role of the engine of world
political and economic development, constituting what may be
called “a core bloc” in the world system.
A core bloc is not merely an aggregation of states. As the “his-
toric bloc” in Gramsci’s terminology implies, a “bloc” refers to
the structure of society that comprises contradictions with the
dynamic of historical change.3 By the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the bloc of those three countries began to form a new seg-
ment of international society with the potential of structural
transformation of the traditional dominant system of Europe. It
was a “core” bloc because, by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, it definitively began to play the role of the engine of global
transformation, setting the rule of development (and underde-
velopment) for the rest of the world.
In particular, the bloc of Britain and France generated the
forces of significant change: Britain represented industrial capi-
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talism and liberalism, and France democracy and nationalism.
They both gave birth even to socialism as a social movement.
The impact of this complex was illustrated by the continental,
though mostly abortive, revolution of 1848, which was a com-
plex combination of the recurrent revolt against the old status
disparity buttressed by the European reactionary regime and
the incipient revolt against the new class disparity caused by the
forces of industrial capitalism. Political democracy was the inte-
gral part of the core bloc.
To counteract the impact of the early-starter core bloc, Ger-
many, Japan, and Italy began to catch up with the core bloc in
the latter half of the nineteenth century by remolding their struc-
ture in pursuit of the complex “capitalism (C)–nationalism (N)–
authoritarianism (A).” This model was aimed at building a
strong capitalist state at the expense of democracy. The C-N-A
model was a reaction of late-starter developed empires to the
core bloc empires, C-N-D. The contrast between the two models
suggests that capitalism and nationalism can develop in combi-
nation with authoritarianism — not necessarily with democracy
—and that the most crucial distinction between the early-starter
empires and the late-starter empires is the presence or absence
of political democracy (D).
By the end of the nineteenth century, the world was roughly
divided into the C-N-D and C-N-A empires. It is a small wonder
that socialist (S) forces alienated by both formed the interna-
tional socialist movements that cut across the boundaries of the
two camps. In the course of the armed conflict between the two,
fragile late-starter empires (Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and
Russian) collapsed, one of which was transformed into a state
socialist empire, S-N-A.
While the C-N-D empires initiated the formal institutionaliza-
tion of the bloc by establishing an international, intergovern-
mental organization (C-I-D), i.e., the League of Nations, and
while the S-N-A Soviet Union set up a tight organization of
international, countergovernmental movement (SIA), i.e., the
Communist International, the Nazis, and the Japanese mili-
tarists remained un-international because of their ethnocentrism
and exclusionary system at home and abroad.
The war between the C-N-D bloc, namely the United Nations,
and the C-N-A Axis led to the latter’s defeat. It was not only a
Macalester International Vol. 1
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military but also a political and ideological defeat. The C-N-D
bloc transformed the C-N-A camp by changing (A) into (D), that
is, democratization and demilitarization of the C-N-A regime,
which was thereby incorporated into the Western bloc (C-N-D).
The post – World War II world was polarized into two blocs,
one headed by the C-N-D core bloc and the other by the S-N-A
superpower. The end of the Cold War was the consequence of a
global structural change in which the core bloc of the C-N-D
model prevailed over the S-N-A countermodel. So far, we have
dealt with developed empires, whether early-starter or late-
starter. Except for small powers in the North, the rest of the
world (with a few exceptions) consisted of former colonies.
Despite the qualitative difference in historical experience
between the late-starter empires and former colonies, the latter
have tended to adopt either the C-N-A model (e.g., the “bureau-
cratic-authoritarian model”) or the S-N-A model (e.g., the
Maoist model) mainly because all of them, whether empires or
colonies, have one characteristic in common: late-starter vis-à-vis
the C-N-D core bloc.
IV. Unending Historical Contradictions
Looking at the history of the modern world in terms of the struc-
tural change of international society, we can make the following
observations.
• Modern history can be considered as the process through
which the core bloc of early-starter C-N-D regimes played a
twofold, often contradictory, role. On the one hand, it stimu-
lated the development of late-starter societies, but, on the
other, it constrained the development of the latter. It is
through this dual function that the C-N-D bloc penetrated the
rest of the world system.
• The penetration by the C-N-D bloc first took the form of suc-
cessive secessions from the dominant international elite and
regime structure and then, in turn, began to assume a domi-
nant international position to transform the elite and regime
structure of the non-C-N-D world. Both the decisive secession
and the decisive transformation were carried out through his-
toric war, including the world wars and the Cold War. It
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must, therefore, be noted that the wars of historic importance
were not merely the function of the geopolitical rise and fall
of great powers but the indication of a more fundamental
structural change through which non-C-N-D regimes had
been assimilated by or incorporated into the C-N-D regime
core bloc.
• Of all societies in the world system, the C-N-D bloc (plus
some smaller nations in Europe) is an exception where capi-
talist development and nation-state building went hand in
hand with political democratization. This was made possible,
in part, by their initial successful secession, particularly in the
case of Britain and the United States, which could enjoy
“splendid isolation.” Conversely, France, which was more
directly exposed to the impact of European ancien régime, had
to undergo a series of revolutions and counterrevolutions. In
brief, the C-N-D bloc held a historically advantaged and
exceptional position.
• The international penetration and expansion of the C-N-D
bloc, therefore, did not proceed in a linear way but had to face
the statist/nationalist resistance of the historically disadvan-
taged, late-starter regimes. The regimes of late-starter soci-
eties reacted by resorting to the building of a “strong state” as
the engine of developmental “catching up” and national inde-
pendence; and the strong state was associated with authori-
tarianism, collectivism, ethnocentrism, and so forth. The irony
of history is that the democratic development in the C-N-D
bloc — almost of necessity — gave rise to authoritarian devel-
opment in other societies. This was a systemic constraint of
uneven world development.
• Confronting the strong nationalist liberation struggle of
peripheralized former colonies, the core bloc empires faced a
dilemma derived from the contradiction between the core
bloc’s defense of state nationalism and democracy (N-D) at
home and its practice of imperial authoritarian domination
abroad. The empires of the core bloc were destined to disinte-
grate through the withdrawal of their external political
expansion. In return, the core bloc began to restructure the C-
N-D bloc by consolidating its institutional frameworks in the
expanded C-N-D region in the North, such as EC (EU), the
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Trilateral Commission, G-7, NAFTA, IMF/World Bank, and
various other regional or global organizations.
• It should by now be clear that since the eighteenth century,
the C-N-D regime bloc has played the active role of the pri-
mary engine of global structural change, giving rise to a vari-
ety of reactive developments; and, while the bloc consisted of
“state-nations” (N), capitalism (C) generated the trend
toward internationalization, and democracy (D) toward the
perpetual process of deepening democratization — the two
basic trends mentioned above that are at work today in pro-
moting global transformation.
The apparent globalization of the C-N-D bloc model led to the
notion of “the end of history.” In reality, however, history can-
not come to an end with the globalization of the C-N-D model
because its dynamic comprises fundamental contradictions.
First, while the capitalist development of necessity gives rise
to uneven, unequal, and inequitable development, democracy is
committed to equality and equity. While capitalist international-
ization brings advantages to those who have capital, technology,
knowledge, and other resources to profit from internationaliza-
tion, e.g., multinationals,—which, in turn, make the advantaged
even more privileged—the disadvantaged tend to fail to benefit
from internationalization. In fact, they even suffer from it, often
being more marginalized than ever, —witness the case of
indigenous peoples.
Second, capitalist internationalization, utilizing the resources
at the disposal of the advantaged, normally proceeds far ahead
of political democratization, which must rely on the mobiliza-
tion of the disadvantaged. There is an inevitable time lag
between the two. Thus, there are a number of instances that
demonstrate that the multinational capital penetrated the South
prior to the growth and spread of democracy and that capital-
ism was coupled with ruthless authoritarianism, which was to
be democratized at a later stage, involving an enormous cost in
terms of human rights. This applies to the newly industrializing
economies model (NICs or NIES)—particularly the “successful”
Asian NIES — which are now almost regarded by the elite of an
increasing number of developing countries as the model after
the demise of the alternative state socialist model.
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Third, the failure of a number of developing countries to
emulate the NIES led to a disorganized economy characterized
by the enormous disparity between the rich and poor, the
poverty of the marginalized poor whose human dignity and
identity tend to be ensured only by religious fundamentalism,
and the intensified conflict defined in terms of ethno-national
“imagined community” over the resources that are perceived to
be in short supply (a zero-sum perception vis-à-vis “the other”).
Fourth, even in successful NIES, environmental degradation
has gone from bad to worse as a result of the growth-first policy
of the elite, the export-oriented depletion of natural resources,
and the penetration of consumer culture promoted by multina-
tional and local enterprises. This refers to a new dimension that
questions the validity and viability of the fundamental ecologi-
cal premise of the C-N-D model.
Fifth, although the C-N-D bloc has penetrated almost every
corner of the globe as a result of the demise of the state socialist
bloc, there are regime and elite structures that continue to main-
tain themselves impervious to the C-N-D penetration. They are
small in number, isolated, and even helpless, particularly in con-
nection with the local conflict to which they are a party with lit-
tle support of the international community: Iran-Iraq,
India-Pakistan, North Korea–South Korea/U.S., and, to a lesser
extent, Israel-Arab states. It is precisely this helplessness that
has driven them to build a nuclear fortress. Without it, the
regime and elite structure, in their views, would have been
transformed in accordance with the dictates of the C-N-D
model. The last phase of the global penetration of the C-N-D
bloc will have to confront a new challenge — nuclear prolifera-
tion.
V. Critical Global Problematiques
Against this background, it is clear that history cannot come to
an end. It is true that modern history demonstrated that the
expansion and penetration of the C-N-D bloc model was irre-
sistible, as shown by the defeat of the Axis powers and the col-
lapse of the socialist camp, but this was not a Hegelian
culmination of Weltgeist. History has entered a new phase in
which the basic contradictions of the modern world have
Macalester International Vol. 1
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become all the more visible thanks to the very global “triumph”
of the C-N-D model that has been the core of modernity.
Indeed, the globalization of the C-N-D model amounts to the
formation of what one may call “the international community”
today. It is, therefore, no accident that the organizer of this con-
ference has linked “the international community” with “the
emergence of world (dis)order,” and, to the extent that the C-N-
D model has been globalized, its contradictions have also
assumed the character of the global problematiques.
An international consensus seems to have formed over the
last couple of decades that the global problematiques concern
the following four categories of value: peace and security; devel-
opment and social justice; human rights and democracy; and
ecological balance and resource conservation.4 The question is:
What critical global problems in those areas stem from the fun-
damental contradictions?
A. Peace/Disparity Problematique
Fortunately, the greatest threat to humankind, the global
nuclear holocaust, has receded as a result of the ending of the
Cold War. The subsequent emergence of a unipolar world mili-
tary order suggests that the decreased danger of nuclear war is a
product not so much of the progress in nuclear disarmament as
the accession of the United States to the position of unrivaled
nuclear hegemony. The new world military order is extremely
hierarchical, reflecting the uneven development of industrialism
and science/technology in modern history. It is also this uneven
industrial/technological development that has made it possible
for the United States to internationalize the military order into
which most major powers have been incorporated. The multina-
tional coalition forces at the time of the Gulf War are a case in
point. In the military area, too, it is the advantaged who have
first profited from internationalization. It is natural that this mil-
itary order, which is highly nonegalitarian, as exemplified by
the nuclear nonproliferation regime, should face strong criti-
cisms.
The danger of unequal order is that it gives plausible legiti-
mation to the demand of subordinate powers for equality.
Besides the danger of nuclear proliferation, there has been great
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difficulty in legitimating bans or restrictions on the transfer of
conventional arms. These have been opposed not only by the
military-industrial complex of the North but also by the regimes
of the South on the grounds that the measures will perpetuate
the North-South military disparity, in addition to economic
unevenness. It is due to this aspiration to reduce military
inequality that developing countries have wasted their wealth
by purchasing highly sophisticated, expensive modern
weapons.
Military and economic disparity are the function of the
uneven development of modern industrialism; all contradict the
search for a more egalitarian, democratic international order.
The desire for egalitarian military order can lead to a world
where every nation is equally equipped, for instance, with
nuclear weapons, but it may also lead to a world where every
nation is equally disarmed. The latter scenario will be feasible
only if initiatives are taken by the advantaged for dismantling
the arsenals of modern weapons, giving priority to a democratic
world order rather than retaining the historically acquired privi-
leges, in order to minimize the adverse effects of uneven indus-
trial development in terms of peace and security.
While both nuclear weapons and modern conventional arms
have their own logic as military hardware that affects politics,
another peace/security issue involves politics and economy as
independent variables with military components as dependent.
It is what is generally called “regional conflict,” “ethnic con-
flict,” or “internal war.” As the main form of conflict in the post–
Cold War period, it is defined in terms of ethno-cultural or even
civilizational clash escalated into armed dispute. The underly-
ing argument is that the East-West ideological conflict has been
replaced by ethno-cultural conflict, which, allegedly, is existen-
tially more deeply rooted in human conditions into which peo-
ple were born than the ideological contest that was essentially a
matter of choice.
There are, however, several questionable points in the argu-
ment that ethno-cultural groups of different cultures or civiliza-
tions are bound to generate conflict, to fight, and to kill each
other.
First, ethno-cultural difference is not the same as ethno-cul-
tural conflict. The question that can rightly be asked is: “Under
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what conditions will groups of different cultures come into con-
flict; and under what conditions will the conflict turn into vio-
lent conflict?” The shift from difference to conflict and from
conflict to armed conflict cannot be accounted for in terms of the
cultural difference that remains unaltered.
Second, this ethno-cultural or civilizational determinism
overlooks a number of instances in which people of different
cultural, religious, or civilizational backgrounds live together
peacefully.
Third, the very idea that there is inevitable conflict or incom-
patibility among cultures is a reflection of a particular type of
culture. It has often been said, for instance, that the conflict
between Christian civilization and Islamic civilization is
inevitable, but this is simply untrue because a number of Chris-
tians and Moslems peacefully coexist in various parts of the
world. It is true however, that each has often been perceived by
the other as incompatible. Perceived incompatibility has been a
salient feature of the two religious civilizations that share one
particular characteristic, namely monotheistic universalism.
Many polytheistic cultures take a more or less eclectic attitude
toward other cultures and religions.
Thus, cultural/civilizational determinism is not a tenable sci-
entific proposition but rather a political ideology designed to
rationalize conflict in defense of one’s interests, which are not
cultural but political and socioeconomic. The fact that most of
the “regional conflicts” or “ethnocide” today take place in the
underdeveloped areas or the former state socialist regions — all
under economic disorder and social anomie — indicates that the
fundamental problems are under- or mal-development that
brought about unequal and inequitable distribution of resources
among and within ethno-national groups. It would appear that,
here again, the ethno-national or civilizational conflict is a mani-
festation of the deeper contradiction between uneven develop-
ment and subsequent exclusion on the one hand and the
demand for equal rights and nondiscriminatory distribution of
resources on the other.
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B. Development/Democracy Problematique
Just as peace and security issues are closely interrelated with
development issues, the latter, in turn, are interrelated with
democracy and human rights issues.
First, modern capitalist development has proceeded by giving
rise to the disparity between the North and South and also
within the South (and North). Even in early-nineteenth-century
Britain, where early-starter industrial capitalism developed
under the most favorable conditions as compared with late-
starter capitalism, the disparity between rich and poor was enor-
mous and the conditions of workers were inhumane, as
evidenced by the exclusion of Charles Dickens and Friedrich
Engels from parliamentary representation. All late-starter capi-
talism, including that of contemporary developing countries,
sought economic growth at the expense of peoples’ democratic
participation. The political exclusion of workers (and peasants)
made it even more difficult for them to attain a decent living
standard through the existing institutional channels; hence, a
series of riots and repressive measures including the universal
practice of torture. To avoid the enormous human cost involved,
it is imperative to pursue an alternative, namely democratic eco-
nomic development.
Another dimension of contradiction between development on
the one hand and democracy and human rights on the other
concerns the late-starter underdeveloped societies exemplified
by most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and
the Caribbean. The people and children who are suffering
severely from poverty, starvation, and malnutrition are so mar-
ginalized by world capitalist development that they are, in
effect, dispensable and disposable according to the logic of the
world market economy. They can be forgotten by the North,
whose aid to them, extended during the Cold War, has been
diverted to former state socialist countries that carry greater
political and economic weight for the industrialized North.
While exploitation is peripheralization by commission, this
neglect is marginalization by omission. The problem will not be
solved on the basis of the logic of capitalist market economy
unless the logic of market is counteracted by the forces strug-
gling for democracy and human rights. This is another area
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where alternative democratic economic development from a
global perspective is badly needed.
C. Human Rights/Culture/Population Problematique
The issue of human rights has recently been conceptualized by a
growing number of people in connection with two issue areas—
culture and demography.
First, the question posed by some non-Western regimes con-
cerns whether human rights are universal or essentially West-
ern. There is no doubt that the cultural relativism that underlies
this argument has been quite useful in revealing and demystify-
ing the cultural imperialism of the West that historically served
to rationalize Western political and economic imperialism. At
the same time, cultural relativism has often been used by non-
Western regimes to rationalize the local oppression and authori-
tarian rule infringing upon the rights and dignity of the local
people. The concept of human rights as a universal standard,
therefore, is a useful criterion for the critique of local tyranny;
but it may provide a rationale for the penetration and imposi-
tion of Western values. These are the subtle dilemmas of cul-
tural relativism.
Without going further into the detail of epistemological argu-
ment,5 we can point out that, while we must acknowledge that
the value of cultural diversity and the universality of human
rights have yet to be synthesized, it is increasingly recognized
worldwide as self-evident that a culture that defies the basic
needs and fundamental rights of its people cannot claim the
right to cultural relativity. In other words, the universality of the
right to cultural relativity is an idea that has been advanced
through the process of contemporary historical dialectics. In
fact, it is one of the consequences of the struggle for a deepening
of democracy that is under way on an increasingly universal
scale.
The fact that the argument made by a political regime — not
by individual thinkers — in favor of cultural relativity is found
mostly in developing countries indicates that the issue is a
dimension of the problem of uneven development. In this
respect, the insistence on cultural relativity may be interpreted
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to be a demand for cultural equality to make up for the inequal-
ity in economic, technological, political, and other areas.
Second, the issue of human rights has been and will be closely
linked with the question of population explosion.
In modern history, importance was attached to population
first as military manpower and then, in the course of capitalist
industrialization, as skilled and unskilled labor force. Whether
as military manpower or industrial manpower, population has
long been treated as one of the objective factors of production
and growth. The manipulation of population increase or
decrease under the Nazi and other racist regimes was the most
grotesque admission of treating population as an object.
In the post – World War II period, an increasing number of
regimes have been compelled to treat population as subjects
because population has become a numerical expression of the
people with whom sovereignty resides. Population has become a
quantitative sum total of the subjects of human rights.
In the past, “overpopulation” was often adjusted through
war, genocide, and/or plague. Today, a regime that adopts this
scheme will lose legitimacy and is likely to crumble. At the same
time, the inviolability of the right and dignity of the people has
apparently made it difficult for a regime to enforce population
control from above.
According to a recent forecast by the World Bank, the world
population will reach 8.5 billion in the year 2030. No doubt this
is a demographic manifestation of uneven world mal-develop-
ment. The population explosion in the South reveals the com-
plex conflict between the adverse effects of mal-development
and the growing awareness of the rights of the people that no
“legitimate” political regime can readily ignore. However, this
will be a situation that will hamper the very realization of
human rights of the people. This will be a bleak prospect that
may aggravate the perceived zero-sum situation that may pre-
cipitate a “democratic bankruptcy” — if not a “demographic
war” — unless democratic development is put into effect. (Note
the case of Rwanda.)
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D. Environment/Democracy Problematique
The demographic crisis that involves resource mal-consumption
of necessity aggravates environmental decay. Development of
industrial capitalism has increased the consumption of natural
resources at an almost exponential rate, particularly since the
1960s, when the East and South as well as the West embarked on
high rate of economic growth as if it were a good in itself. Thus,
for instance, carbon dioxide in the air, which had increased by
14 percent from 1860 to 1960 (in itself a dramatic change in the
long history of humankind), began to increase by the annual
rate of 5 percent. Further, to the extent industrial growth was
uneven, resource consumption was mainly devoted to the inter-
est of the North. The North has been taking preemptive action
vis-à-vis the South in depleting resources, raising the fundamen-
tal issue of the equitable allocation of the resources of the globe
that are the common heritage of humankind. This is another
manifestation of the contradiction between uneven develop-
ment and democratic world order.
However, if the equitable allocation of resources will have to
be achieved through the mechanical universalization of the pre-
sent and prospective levels of consumption of the North, an eco-
logical catastrophe on a global scale will be hard to avoid. The
Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, which, in effect, was the ideology of the early phase of
capitalist growth premised on the perceived infinity of the envi-
ronment, will turn out to be self-defeating. It should be clear that
“limits to growth” pose a fundamental challenge to the C-N-D
core bloc model, which has historically been associated with the
liberal myth of modernity that posits the harmony of the maxi-
mization of private interests and that of public interests. Here
again, the “triumph” of the C-N-D model has made its contra-
dictions all the more pronounced. In order to cope with the envi-
ronmental crisis, the concept of democracy must be deepened,
adding to it a new dimension of ecological harmony that con-
cerns the quality of democratic life. This will probably call for a
spiritual deepening rather than the material improvement of
civil society.
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VI. Agency
A. The State Eroded
While the nature and magnitude of these problems have become
global, the agents who deal with them remain essentially
national. This incongruence between the global character of fun-
damental problematiques and the state system that provides the
framework of response is one of the salient features of today’s
world. The problematiques have surpassed the actors in scale
and magnitude.
This incongruence has much to do with the structural compo-
nents of the C-N-D model. Industrial capitalism (C) has been the
primary engine of globalizing the problematiques. Democracy,
while promoting the transnational penetration of its ideology
and movements, still remains primarily within the institutional
framework of the “sovereign nation-state” (N). Political democ-
racy is largely a national democracy (N-D). This incongruence is
a reflection of the deeper uneven development that is eroding
the state system.
First, as capitalism has incorporated the whole world into a
single market economy, it has accelerated a twofold erosion of
the sovereignty of the state. On one hand, the economy has
gained globality, transcending the nation-state; on the other, the
free market has attained within the individual state a higher
degree of autonomy, making the state less important for the eco-
nomic life in civil society.
Second, political democracy, though predominantly within
the framework of nation-state, has posed a twofold challenge to
the authority of the state. On one hand, the state has turned into
an instrumental mechanism in order to meet the welfare and
human rights requirements of the people; on the other, with the
diffusion of ideological coherence and the mounting popular
pressures for interest articulation, the political party has weak-
ened its credibility and efficacy as the solid vehicle of national
integration, thereby giving rise to perpetual instability of the
political regime based on a precarious coalition of diverse inter-
ests. Hence, capitalism and democracy are eroding the old
world order based on the state system, thus generating a “world
disorder.”
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These dynamics of change, however, have taken contrasting
forms depending upon the structural context of transformation.
In the North, erosion of the state system has been compensated
by the creation or strengthening of international organizations.
This is best illustrated by the European Union. Further, the
forces of internationalization/regionalization in Europe have
been counteracted by the movements for democratization that
are also expressing themselves through international institu-
tions such as the European Parliament. The UN Security Coun-
cil, which is under the virtual control of the United States plus
Britain and France, as well as G-7 and NAFTA are all operated
with a view to establishing an international order geared to the
promotion of the Northern regional interests.
In the South, as tragically exemplified by sub-Saharan African
states (and, to a lesser extent, by the transition states of the for-
mer socialist camp), the ruthless penetration of world capitalist
market economy has brought about even the disintegration of
the state as the result of the disappearance of the traditional
mutual aid community; exodus of peasants and proliferation of
shantytowns; intensified disparity between rich and poor; cor-
ruption resulting from the commodification of political power;
mushrooming organized crime, drug traffic, and violence; geno-
cide of the common people by armed gangs and disorganized
army; and a deluge of refugees. All of this points to the incapac-
ity of the state to maintain order and authority.
Further, introduction or imposition of a spurious multiparty
system under the pressure of the Western and IMF political con-
ditionality gave birth not to pluralistic democracy but to the
bloody rivalry of the plurality of tribes, clans, and religious
sects. This is not simply an ethno-national conflict; conflict
within ethno-national groups is equally intense. This is a disor-
der rooted in poverty, disparity, and a scramble for resources.
If the state is being debilitated as the main pillar of world
order, we must examine the role to be played by nonstate actors
on two levels, namely the people and international organiza-
tions.
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B. Transnational Citizens
What, then, does this erosion of the state imply for the people of
the world?
For the citizens of the North, the logical conclusion of the ero-
sion of the state’s sovereignty and authority is the reinforcement
of the citizens’ transnational network of human solidarity paral-
lel to and as a countervailing force against the strengthening of
intergovernmental organizations and multinational corporate
market forces. As the activities of a number of NGOs demon-
strate, citizens’ transnational solidarity is no longer a lofty ideal;
it is a reality that has been cumulatively established. On many
African scenes of tragedy, it has been the NGOs, such as
Médecins sans Frontières, who came to help the local people
much ahead of the UN peacekeeping, disaster/refugee relief
contingents recruited from member states.
For the people of the South, however, the picture is different.
The erosion of state sovereignty and authority implies bleak
prospects for the self-reliant development strategy that aims at
building an autonomous “strong state” as a vehicle for eco-
nomic development and democracy within the national frame-
work, opening it to the international market selectively and step
by step. Instead, underdeveloped countries may have to take an
unprecedented course of combining a “soft state,” mostly in the
form of a multiethnic federal state, with strong international
governmental and transnational nongovernmental cooperation.
Thus, a greater role of citizens of the North will be called for in
reinforcing cooperation with the people in the South.
What is common to the people of the North and the South is
the inevitable weakening of loyalty to the state and the search
for a strengthening of transnational solidarity as human beings.
C. The United Nations System
The other nonstate actors that seek to transcend the individual
sovereign state are international organizations, of which the
most global in terms of membership and functions is the United
Nations system.
There are at least three major functions that the UN is
expected to perform: (1) reflection of conflict and the articulation
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of issues in its agenda, (2) legitimation of the standards and
norms according to which the conflict should be resolved, and
(3) actual conflict resolution. Views diverge as to whether the
UN has met the expectations of its founders. General assessment
seems to be that the achievement score has been in the above
order, with the reflection function and the legitimation function
being more successful than the resolution function. The achieve-
ment score must be examined in relation to the issue areas the
UN has been dealing with, namely (a) peace and security, (b)
development, (c) decolonization, (d) human rights, and (e) envi-
ronment. Since the issue areas on which the UN has primarily
focused have been changing, reflecting the changing realities of
the world, a brief historical summary of the UN’s role in defin-
ing its role is in order.
The history of the UN can be roughly divided into four
phases. The first was from its inception to the early l960s, when
the primary focus of concern was on “peace and security.” This
was natural in view of the fact that the memory of the largest
war in history, World War II, was still very vivid in the minds of
the people of the world. Further, the fear of another world war,
a war of nuclear annihilation, was menacing all nations of the
world. The second phase was the 1960s. The main focus was on
“decolonization and development,” reflecting the crucial inter-
ests of the emerging nations in Asia and Africa. In the third
phase, which began in the 1970s, “environment and human
rights” came to the fore. We are now in the fourth phase, post –
Cold War, in which concern for “peace and security” has
reemerged coupled with that of “human rights.”
This summary does not imply that each phase was preoccu-
pied with specific issues to the exclusion of others. There was,
however, a notable shift of the primary focus, the UN’s ceaseless
involvement in all issues notwithstanding.
Beyond the shift of focus, what is more significant is the
change in the manner in which relations between the issues
were conceptualized. In the first phase, “peace and security”
was considered the ultimate goal. “Development” was, of
course, taken up; but it was done so because poverty was con-
sidered a cause of war. “Decolonization” was dealt with because
colonialism was considered a cause of war. “Human rights”
were seriously debated as illustrated by the adoption of the Uni-
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versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948; but underlying this
concern about human rights was the view that a state whose
regime violated human rights at home was likely to take an
aggressive policy abroad in violation of the rights of other
nations. In short, decolonization, development, and human
rights were prerequisites for, or the means to, “peace and secu-
rity.”
In the second phase, each began to be recognized as an end in
itself. “Decolonization,” for example, was considered a goal
independent of “peace,” hence the endorsement of the armed
struggle for national liberation. A certain degree of East-West
détente enabled nations of the world to pursue development
goals irrespective of their implications for international peace
and security.
In the third phase, however, a critical review of development
programs, such as the UN Decade of Development, led to a new
emphasis on environment and the quality of life, namely the
implications for the life of humanity, which, in turn, was linked
with the concern about human rights. Further, doubt was cast at
the superpowers’ equation of “peace and security” with
“mutual nuclear deterrence” because the latter tended to ratio-
nalize the “condominium” and the continued nuclear arms race
of the superpowers. The catastrophic implications of the danger
of nuclearism for the environment and the right to survival of
humanity were unmistakably revealed by the Chernobyl inci-
dent. Finally, there was a growing awareness that “national lib-
eration” had not necessarily led to the “liberation of the people.”
In other words, “peace and security,” “national liberation,”
“development,” and “environment” all began to be considered
as the requisites for the realization of the ultimate goal, i.e.,
human rights. There has been an important reversal of the
means-end relation, all converging on the rights and dignity of
human beings.
Against this background, it is a small wonder that the fourth
phase has witnessed the combination of the renewed interest in
“peace and security” with the continued concern for “human
rights,” as exemplified by the primary focus of attention placed
by the United Nations on “humanitarian intervention.”
These changes in thinking, which underlie the redefinition of
the goal and role of the United Nations, have implications of
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great importance in two respects. On one hand, the changes are
the manifestations of the historic dynamic of global democrati-
zation discussed above. They are rooted in the macrohistorical
realities of the universalization of democratic (D) norms and
principles underway.
On the other hand, the convergence on human rights has
revealed the fundamental limitations of the United Nations.
Institutionally, the UN is an organization of states, not of the
people; and, politically, the regimes of many member states are,
in practice, still far from democratic.
VII. Conclusion: Toward a Democratic World Organization
Resolution of this dilemma calls for a radical transformation of
the principles and constitution of the United Nations in order to
make it a democratic body with the participation of the citizens
of the world, but that is not forthcoming. Numerous proposals
on UN reform have been presented; and many more will come
in conjunction with its fiftieth anniversary; but significant
reforms are unlikely to materialize because the proposals are
prepared for the deliberation of those who have vested interests
in the present UN system and/or state system.
Yet, the tide for global democratization must not be stemmed
lest the United Nations become a reactionary and burdensome
entity. To link the UN system with democracy, the UN must
integrate into its operation the growing role played by citizens
in building transnational networks. The following are some fea-
sible proposals that are illustrative of the steps toward signifi-
cant but gradual democratic reform of the UN system.
Peacekeeping operations, to which the post–Cold War United
Nations gave highest priority, has run into difficulty mainly
because of the conflict between the national interest considera-
tions of member states on one hand and the human interest con-
siderations that ought to be espoused by the UN on the other.
The decision taken by the United States on May 5, 1994, to give
priority to national interest considerations when asked by the
United Nations to take part in peacekeeping operations is a case
in point. This dilemma was highlighted by the conflict between
the objective of the U.S. military (which was professedly the
maintenance of “national security”) and, for instance, the mis-
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sion of U.S. soldiers in Somalia who had to risk their lives
despite the uncertainty over whether the U.S. national interest
was really at stake. As long as the UN relies on the supply of
national contingents by its member states, which is a diversion
from the original objective of the army and the recruited sol-
diers, there is always the danger that UN peacekeeping opera-
tions will be paralyzed.
To avoid this problem, Brian Urquhart has suggested that the
United Nations organize its own volunteer force.6 Although the
idea has merits, it has a drawback if the UN force is for peace-
enforcement, i.e. combat, operation as well. The idea of UN
combat operation amounts to the idea of “just war by the United
Nations,” on which no global consensus has been formed. Is the
United Nations entitled to kill noncombatant citizens for the
maintenance of “international peace and security” or for
“humanitarian purposes”? How many unhumanitarian acts
may the United Nations commit in order to enforce humanitar-
ian intervention? These questions remain unanswered.
In the absence of a plausible theory of just UN war, the mis-
sion of the United Nations should be confined to noncombative
peacekeeping operations essentially based on prior diplomatic
accommodations and the subsequent consent of the parties in
conflict. A more conceivable alternative to the UN volunteer
force would be the establishment of a volunteer UN peacekeep-
ing corps in each country. Since it is not for combat purposes, it
should be separate from the national army. A peacekeeping
corps not for killing even at a place where killing is committed
by the parties in conflict obviously requires special training dif-
ferent from the ordinary discipline of regular armed forces. The
corps would be an armored police force rather than the army.
The UN standby force in the Nordic countries has been orga-
nized along these lines. The time has come to urge member
states to set up the peacekeeping corps specialized in UN police
functions.
In addition to the police component, civilian corps for med-
ical, construction, transportation, communication, administra-
tive, and educational purposes should be organically composed;
but, except for the period of special training, the volunteers in
these civilian corps may stay in the regular workplace as profes-
sionals earmarked for UN operation, thus serving to link the
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United Nations directly with civil society as well as with the
state. It would be financed mainly by the government but may
also be supported by citizens’ contributions. If the peacekeeping
corps is established in many countries, standardization of equip-
ment and the code of conduct to improve its efficiency in inter-
national joint action would be facilitated and a sense of
transnational solidarity of citizens enhanced.
In a similar vein, a UN peace corps for development and envi-
ronment should be established in as many developed countries
as possible. In most countries in the North, a peace corps or an
aid institution has been at work; but, again, it is a national gov-
ernmental institution primarily intended to serve national inter-
ests on a bilateral basis even though it may take an altruistic
form. Time has come to reorganize these national institutions so
that they will constitute a worldwide multilateral UN network
of the Peace Corps for “sustainable development.” It should be a
corps earmarked for UN activities, consisting of volunteers with
professional skills higher than those of the present Peace Corps
but with the same spirit of spontaneous dedication. The present
UN Volunteer Program is too small to meet the needs of the peo-
ple in the South. A large number of people experienced and
skilled in agriculture, forestry, water utilization, medicine,
small- and medium-scale industries, and other fields should be
able to participate in the UN network as volunteer citizens.
Democratization of the world organization, the United
Nations, cannot be achieved by such measures as expanding the
membership of the Security Council—with or without veto—or
even by elevating the status of the General Assembly. In the
final analysis, it is individual human beings, not the state, who
can be the subject of democratic rights. The group right of
national self-determination is important, but equality of nations
is important because it is a necessary condition for fulfilling the
equal rights of individual human beings, not the other way
around. Through the direct participation of a sizable number of
individual volunteers in UN operations for coping with world
disorder, these citizens will gain greater voice in redefining the
role to be played by the United Nations, particularly in the field,
as one of the key engines of the fundamental historical dynamic
of the universalization and deepening of democracy.
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1. “Ism” in this paper refers not to ideology alone but to historical forces that
constitute a particular dynamic of, in Anthony Giddens’s terminology, “struc-
turation.” “Nationalism” refers to the primary political orientation to the self-
identified “sovereign nation-state,” which is an “imagined community.” In
this respect, both “imperialist” nationalism and “anti-imperialist” nationalism
are included in “state nationalism.” Since any “nation-state” comprises more
than one nationality, “state nationalism” embodies the nationalism of the dom-
inant national or ethnic group in the state. For further detail of the three
dimensions of modern world conflict, see Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., “Perspec-
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